Over the years computer systems have evolved from centralized monolithic computing devices supporting static applications, into networked environments that allow complex forms of distributed mobile computing. As the sophistication of mobile software increases, so do the associated security threats and vulnerabilities.
INTRODUCTION
Computer networks are evolving at a fast pace. The technologies, architectures, and methodologies traditionally used to develop distributed applications exhibit a variety of limitations and drawbacks when applied to large scale distributed settings (e.g., the Internet). The most promising and intriguing approach to address the issues related to these large-scale distributed settings is mobile code.
Code mobility can be defined informally as the capability to dynamically change the bindings between code fragments and the location where they are executed. Mobile code is the code that traverses a network in its lifetime and executes on a destination machine. The ability to relocate code is a powerful concept that originated a very interesting range of developments. The risks of having such an arbitrary piece of code executing on a local machine is evident. There may be a virus attached to the code that could infect the machine when the code is run. The program may also be a Trojan horse, appearing to do something useful while taking over the machine.
In the past, mobile code was usually machine dependent and could only run on very specific machine architectures. Also, obtaining such code involved the whole process of searching for applications on FTP sites, downloading the applications, sometimes compiling them and then running them on the local machine. Today with the advent of the of the Internet and Web-based programs, applications can be written in a common programming language and can run wherever they end up, independent of underlying machine architectures. Systems for creating such mobile code are widely used and include languages such as Java, JavaScript, VBScript, ActiveX and Word macros.
Also, mobile code now can be downloaded and run with a single click of the mouse and sometimes even without the user knowing about it. As we are becoming more dependent on the Internet and the global information infrastructure, we are becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious attacks and defective software. The Melissa and Happy99 viruses are examples of such attacks that exploit bugs in mobile code systems. For this reason, the security of mobile code is emerging as one of the most important challenges facing computer research today.
In this paper, we exploit some of the issues involving mobile code security. We look at security policies needed to ensure code safety and also define the notion of trust in security systems.
We will also be examining some of the areas of research concerning the problem of securing mobile code and, finally, we will give an overview of some of the solutions that attempt to ensure the security of mobile code and the safety of machines on the Internet today.
There are four practical techniques for securing mobile code. The first method is to limit the privileges of the executable to a small set of operations; this is known as the sandbox model. The second technique is to obtain assurance that the source of the executable is trusted; this is the code signing approach. The third approach to securing clients from mobile code is to examine executables as they enter a trusted domain and make a decision about whether or how to run them on the client based on specific properties of the executables; this is the firewalling approach. The final technique called proof-carrying code is discussed where mobile programs carry with them a proof that certain properties are satisfied. We describe all the four approaches and the trust model that it assumes.
MOBILE CODE SYSTEMS
Mobile code systems are conceived to operate in large scale settings where networks are composed of heterogeneous hosts, managed by different authorities with different levels of trust, and connected by links with different bandwidths (e.g., wireless slow connections and fast optical links). Mobile code systems address a wide range of needs and requirements, such as service customization, dynamic extension of application functionality, autonomy, fault tolerance, and support for disconnected operations. Traditional systems may provide True Distributed System (TDS) layer that hides the distribution from the programmer. TDS provides network transparency. Network Operating System (NOS) provides the non-transparent communication services. Technologies supporting code mobility, explicitly represent the location concept, thus the programmer needs to specify where -i.e., in which Computational Environment (CE) -a computation has to take place. The CE here, provides applications with the capability to dynamically relocate their components on different hosts.
Mobile Code Systems vs. Traditional Systems

Component
SECURITY
Although this paper talks about security mechanisms in mobile code system, it is important to begin by talking about traditional computer security and what it means for a system to be secure. All secure systems could be judged, based on the following six basic criteria.
Security Policy -There must be an explicit and well-defined security policy enforced by the system.
Host
Host Given identified subjects and objects, there must be a set of rules that are used by the system to determine whether a given subject can be permitted to gain access to a specific object. Computer systems of interest must enforce a mandatory security policy that can effectively implement access rules for handling sensitive (e.g., classified) information.
Marking -Access control labels must be associated with objects.
In order to control access to information stored in a computer, according to the rules of a mandatory security policy, it must be possible to mark every object with a label that reliably identifies the object's sensitivity level (e.g., classification), and/or the modes of access accorded those subjects who may potentially access the object.
Identification -Individual subjects must be identified.
Each access to information must be mediated based on who is accessing the information and what classes of information they are authorized to deal with. This identification and authorization information must be securely maintained by the computer system and be associated with every active element that performs some security-relevant action in the system. Accountability -Audit information must be selectively kept and protected so that actions affecting security can be traced to the responsible party.
A trusted system must be able to record the occurrences of security-relevant events in an audit log. The capability to select the audit events to be recorded is necessary to minimize the expense of auditing and to allow efficient analysis. Audit data must be protected from modification and unauthorized destruction to permit detection and afterthe-fact investigation of security violations.
Assurance -The computer system must contain hardware/software mechanisms that can be independently evaluated to provide sufficient assurance that the system enforces [the above requirements].
In order to assure that the four requirements of Security Policy, Marking, Identification, and Accountability are enforced by a computer system, there must be some identified and unified collection of hardware and software controls that perform those functions. These mechanisms are typically embedded in the operating system and are designed to carry out the assigned tasks in a secure manner. The basis for trusting such system mechanisms in their operational setting must be clearly documented such that it is possible to independently examine the evidence to evaluate their sufficiency.
Continuous Protection -The trusted mechanisms that enforce these basic requirements must be continuously protected against tampering and/or unauthorized changes.
No computer system can be considered truly secure if the basic hardware and software mechanisms that enforce the security policy are themselves subject to unauthorized modification or subversion. The continuous protection requirement has direct implications throughout the computer system's lifecycle..
ISSUES IN MOBILE CODE SECURITY
Threats to the security of mobile code generally falls into four comprehensive classes.
Disclosure of information. Denial of service Corruption of information Interference or nuisance Mobility allows an agent to move or hop among different platforms. The platform provides the computational environment for the code to execute. The home platform is the most trusted environment for any mobile agent. The agent platform supports multiple locations for the agents to interact. The figure depicts the movement of agent among several agent platforms. The four threat categories are identified as,
Network
Agent Against Agent Platform
The mobile agent paradigm requires an agent platform to accept and execute code developed elsewhere. An incoming agent has two main lines of attack. The first is to gain unauthorized access to information residing at the agent platform; the second is to use its authorized access in an unexpected and disruptive fashion.
Agent Platform Against Agent
A receiving agent platform can easily isolate and capture an agent and may attack it by extracting information, corrupting or modifying the code, denying requested services, or simply reinitializing or terminating it completely.
Agents Against other agents
An agent can target another agent using several general approaches. These include actions to falsify transactions, eavesdrop upon conversations, or interfere with an agent's activity.
Other Entities Against Agent System
Even assuming locally active agents and the agent platform are well behaved, other entities both outside and inside the agent framework may attempt actions to disrupt, harm, or subvert the agent system (replay attacks).
SAFETY POLICIES
When downloading software from an unknown or un-trusted source, it would be a good idea to ensure that the software is 'safe' to run. This can be done by applying certain restrictions to the un-trusted software.
For example, we may want to ensure that the un-trusted program will not overwrite critical system data, thereby causing a system crash. We may want to ensure that the program only accesses memory in its own address space and not memory belonging to other applications and processes. We may also want to ensure that the program does not perform illegal disk I/O.
In this context, the definition of 'safe' is known as the application's safety policy. In other words, a safety policy is a set of restrictions placed upon locally run un-trusted code to ensure that the program does not behave in a manner that is detrimental to the system or to the system security.
At the very least, a safety policy should guarantee the following fundamental safety properties:
•
Control Flow Safety
The program should never jump to and start executing code that lies outside of the program's own code segment. All function calls should be to valid function entry points and function returns should return to the location from where the function was called.
Memory Safety
The program should never be allowed to access random locations in memory. The program should only access memory in its own static data segment, live system heap memory that has been explicitly allocated to it and valid stack frames.
• Stack Safety
The program should only be allowed to access the top of the stack. Access to other areas of the stack should be completely restricted.
These three properties, combined, offer the minimum nontrivial level of security for mobile code. More complicated security policies are possible depending on the application.
TRUST
Security is based on the notion of trust. Basically, software can be divided into two categories, namely the software that is trusted and the software that is not, separated by an imaginary trust boundary. All software on our side of the trust boundary is trusted and is known as the trusted code base.
All security implementations rely on some trusted code. As a result, a trust model of a particular implementation can be made. The trust model basically specifies which code is to be included in the trusted code base and which code lies outside of the trust boundary.
At the very least, the trusted code base should include the local operating system kernel, but can also include other items of trusted software like trusted compilers or trusted program runtime environments (e.g. the Java interpreter). It is desirable, however, to keep the trusted code base as small as possible to reduce the security vulnerabilities.
PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY
Unfortunately, as it is in most applications, performance is sacrificed for increased security. It would, however, be profitable to have applications that are both secure and perform well at the same time. For this reason, there is huge research going on concerned with resolving the conflict between these concepts in some way.
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO MOBILE COMPUTING
Many conventional security techniques used in contemporary distributed applications (e.g., client-server) also have utility as countermeasures within the mobile agent paradigm. The mobile code is vulnerable to attack from many sources including malicious agents, malicious platforms, and other malicious entities. The conventional protection techniques employed for trusted systems is due to large part the traditional role hardware plays as the foundation upon which software protection mechanisms are built.
CRYPTOGRAPHY
The use of cryptography can prevent the modification of code in transit across an un-trusted network. Unfortunately cryptography alone cannot guarantee that the downloaded code is safe to run or that it came from a particular source.
Cryptographic methods can be used to encipher information exchanges and to identify and authenticate users, agents and platforms.
KERNEL AS A REFERENCE MONITOR
The security analysis of a system traditionally begins by studying its reference monitor. This is one of the oldest and most widely used security techniques in software systems. A reference monitor is defined to be the portion of code that checks each and every object reference and validates it against the system's security policy. In order to be trustworthy, the reference monitor must be tamper-proof, always invoked, and small enough to be analyzed and tested. The technique involves isolating system critical operations and only allowing access to those operations via the system kernel. The kernel then acts as a proxy, receiving operation requests from processes and executing the operations as necessary.
Kernel performs Process requests
System operation System operation Figure 5 .1: Kernel acts as a proxy between processes and system critical operations
In this way, the kernel can monitor all access, prevent un-trusted code from corrupting the system and enforce various other safety policies.
Kernel calls incur an obvious performance loss. The reason for this is that these calls require some overhead for passing parameters and for saving and restoring registers (context switch). Also, access is limited to a few high-level abstract operations provided by the kernel interface, so programs cannot exploit the properties of low-level data structures to optimize access.
An Implementation of a reference monitor has the following characteristics:
It is always invoked and non-bypassable, mediating all accesses; It is tamper-proof It is small enough to be analyzed and tested.
The trust model for this technique places the system kernel in the trusted code base. All processes running on top of the kernel lie outside the trust boundary.
Security is still meaningless without a security policy.
CODE INSTRUMENTAION
Code instrumentation involves modifying (instrumenting) un-trusted code so that it can be monitored at runtime. As long as the code does not violate the safety policy it can run normally with no change in its functional behavior. If a violation occurs, the system can be notified immediately and the program is either terminated, or the transgression is handled in such a way so as to prevent any adverse effects on the rest of the system. Sandboxing (see Section 6.1) is an example of a technique that uses code instrumentation to enforce certain security restrictions.
One advantage of code instrumentation is that it can be performed in isolation by the consumer. No extra information about the code is needed and no particular assumptions about the code need to be made.
System Critical Operations
Kernel Process
The disadvantage of this method is that there is a substantial runtime overhead. The reason for this is that a runtime check is required for every critical operation. It is possible, however, to remove some runtime checks by analyzing the program beforehand and proving that these checks are unnecessary, but this in turn incurs greater load time overhead. Also, analysis of this sort is incomplete due to the fact that safety properties are generally un-decidable.
The trust model for this technique places the runtime monitoring environment in the trusted code base, while all mobile code is placed outside of the trust boundary.
RECENT APPROACHES TO MOBILE CODE SECURITY
SANDBOXING
Software-Based Fault Isolation, as its name implies, is a method of isolating application modules into distinct fault domains enforced by software. The technique allows un-trusted programs written in an unsafe language, such as C, to be executed safely within the single virtual address space of an application. Un-trusted machine interpretable code modules are transformed so that all memory accesses are confined to code and data segments within their fault domain. Access to system resources can also be controlled through a unique identifier associated with each domain. This technique is called Sandboxing.
The basic idea behind sandboxing is to make the foreign mobile code to be executed within a sandbox in the host operating system. As the name indicates, then the mobile code can be controlled efficiently by allowing monitored access to local host resources like CPU time, memory, etc., so that denial of service attacks by the mobile code like over consuming resources do not occur. One of the most known examples of sandboxing technology is the Security Manager of Java.
In Java, the security manager consists of policies, which allow the extent to which external mobile code can access and use the available resources. These policies explicitly list the rules and restrictions on the execution of mobile code. Therefore, the biggest task is to come up with the correct policies because if the sandbox is strong or rather as weak as the policies provided in the security manager.
Before going to the details of how exactly the sandboxing technology is implemented in Java language, we give an outline of the security features provided by Java. Java is designed to be a type-safe language, which means that both compile time and runtime type of variables, are guaranteed to be compatible. This basically prevents the forging of access to objects to get around access control.
One other big safety feature of Java is the estimation of the 'pointer' data type. This makes it impossible for a malicious user code to directly manipulate memory locations. Also Java's automatic garbage collection of unused memory segments makes it more robust.
The basic security components of Java are the ClassLoader, ByteCode Verifier and the Security Manager. The ClassLoader is a special Java object which is responsible for converting bytecodes to corresponding Java classes. So any remote code first needs to go through the class loader that converts the remote code into local class format so that they can be executed. In the Verifier stage, static type checking, operand overflow checking, are performed on the remote code so as to assure it is a proper virtual machine code. The security manager class is the one, which provides flexible resource access to the remote code depending on the policies configured by the host system user. Actually in the primitive Java implementations of 1.0 and 1.1 there were many attacks possible by making a remote code classified as local which gives full access to all resources. Hence, the security model was later redesigned in JDK1.2 such that the Security manager also scrutinized the local code to grant access to important system resources. The basic security model was later extended in JDK1.1. The concept of signed applets was introduced in this new security model. The idea was to grant remote code more privileges if it can be trusted. 'Trusted Code' is the code which is digitally signed. This concept is explained in more detail in the next section that talks in detail about how Code Signing works.
But in a nutshell, signed applets are delivered with their signatures in the JAR (Java Archive) format. Then if this signature key is recognized at the host system where this mobile code needs to be executed then it becomes 'trusted' mobile code and it enjoys the same privileges as the local code of that host. This model is illustrated in the following diagram.
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The new security architecture provides Fine grained access control.
Valuable Resources
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Easily configurable security policy. Easily extensible access control structure. Extension of security checks to all Java programs including local and remote code.
The idea clearly is to make even local code undergo the rigid security checks as remote mobile code. The changes are depicted in the following figure that illustrates this model.
Local or Remote Code (Signed/Not signed) The biggest problem with the Java sandbox is that any error in any security component can lead to a violation of the security policy. The risks are exacerbated by the complexity of the interaction between components.
The trust model is that the design and implementation of the sandbox is trustworthy but mobile code is universally untrustworthy.
CODE SIGNING
A fundamental technique for protecting an agent system is digitally signing code or objects. A digital signature serves as a means of confirming the authenticity of an object, its origin, and its integrity.
Typically the code signer is either the creator of the code, the user, or some entity that has reviewed the code.
In the Code Signing approach to secure mobile code, the client obtains assurance that the source of mobile code is trusted and the code hasn't been tampered with, since its publication, i.e., client verifies authenticity and integrity. It is based on the trust model, which in this case says, it is possible to distinguish trustworthy authors of mobile code from untrustworthy and that trustworthy author is incorruptible.
MECHANISM
Mobile code authors use digital signatures whenever they want to distribute code, to ensure authenticity and message integrity code (MIC), to ensure data integrity. On the other side, the client manages a list of entities that it trusts. Whenever a mobile executable is received, the client verifies that it is signed by an entity on the list. If so, the client allows it to run, most often with all user privileges. Example implementations of Code Signing are Microsoft's Authenticode system, a common form of code signing, which enables Java applets or ActiveX controls to be signed, ensuring users that the software has not been tampered with or modified and that the identity of the author is verified and Sun's Jarsigner tool for JDK 1.2 .
Digital signatures are created, in general, using a public key signature algorithm such as RSA public key cipher. A public key algorithm uses two different keys: the public key, known to all, and private key, known only to its owner. These public key algorithms are designed so that if one key is used for encryption then the other is necessary for decryption. So in this case the author of mobile code encrypts the mobile code with his private key, which only he and no one else can do, and distributes his public key along with the signed code.
But these public key algorithms are often inefficient (takes longer time) for signing long documents. So the usual practice is to sign the hash of code and distribute it along with the code. Besides saving time this method also serves the purpose of message integrity, as changing original code at one bit will result in complete change of hash of message. At the receiver end the client computes the hash of mobile code it received and compares it with that sent by the user to ensure data integrity.
Following diagram illustrates the implementation of Code Signing technique to ensure mobile code security.
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IMPLEMENTING TRUST MODEL
As we can see the problem arises when we are deciding whom to trust and whom not to? For this Digital Certificates are used. A certificate is a set of data that completely identifies an entity and is issued by Certification Authority (CA), after it has verified the entity's authenticity. So the client upon receiving mobile code looks into the certificate for identity of sender and extracts public key for decrypting the code.
Certification Authorities (CAs) are trustworthy persons or organizations, such as VeriSign. Certificates are verified through a hierarchy of these CAs. Each certificate is linked to the certificate of CA that signed it. By following this verification path to a known, trusted CA, you can be assured that certificate is valid.
End Users End Users
Figure 6.2.2: Implementing Trust Model
In this example Mobile Code author is certified by CA3, who in turn is certified by CA1. The code receiver has a certificate signed by CA4 and CA4 has certificate signed by CA2, which in turn is signed by the Root. Now receiver can verify the author by moving up the verification chain to Root and then Root verifies CA1, which verifies CA3, which verifies the author.
Certificates are valid for the period of time specified by the CA that issued it. The certificate contains information about this period. The CA can also revoke any certificate it has issued, if it finds something wrong, and maintains a list of all such entities whose certificates are revoked. This list is called "Certification Revocation List (CRL)". Trusted CA, ROOT publishes this list from time to time so that anyone can verify the validity of given certificate.
DRAWBACKS
If the intruder manages to change the trusted users list on a client's machine then he can make the client to trust all, untrustworthy authors, and run the malicious code. Malicious Code signed, can plant all manner of delayed attacks. Later, when problems occur there is no way to tie them back to the malicious mobile code which caused that.
The trust model is that it is possible to distinguish trustworthy authors of mobile code from untrustworthy and that trustworthy authors are incorruptible.
Code Signing cannot be used with the firewalling approach.
FIREWALLING
The firewalling approach to securing mobile code involves selectively choosing whether or not to run a program at the very point where it enters the client domain. For example, if an organization is running a firewall or web proxy, it may be useful to try to identify Java applets, examine them, and decide whether or not to serve them to the client. Research shows that it may not always be easy to block unwanted applets while allowing other applets, say ones from the local domain, to run. The firewalling approach assumes that somehow applets can be identified.
Several commercial ventures have been established that use the firewalling approach. For example, Finjan Software and Security 7 have several products that attempt to identify applets and then examine the applets for security properties. Only applets that are deemed safe are allowed to run. Unfortunately, both of these companies use proprietary techniques so the mechanisms they use are not known. This approach is fundamentally limited by the halting problem which states that there is no general purpose algorithm that can determine the behavior of an arbitrary program. Another approach is taken by Malkhi et.al. (developed independently and marketed by Digitivity Inc where Java applets are divided into graphics actions, run on the client machine, and all other actions, which are run on a sacrificial playground machine).
SECURE EXECUTION OF JAVA APPLETS USING A REMOTE PLAYGROUND
The core idea is to establish a dedicated machine (or set of machines) called a playground at which mobile code is transparently executed, using users' browsers as I/O terminals. When a browser retrieves a web page written in Hypertext Markup Language(HTML), it takes actions based on the HTML tags in that page. One such tag is the <applet> tag, which might appear as follows: <applet code=hostile.class …> This tag instructs the browser to retrieve and run the applet named hostile.class from the server that served this page to the browser. The applet that returns is in a format called Java bytecode, suitable for running in any JVM. This bytecode is subjected to a bytecode verification process, loaded into the browser's JVM, and executed. When a browser requests a web page, the request is sent to a proxy (step 1). The proxy forwards the request to the end server (step 2) and receives the requested page (step 3). As the page is received the proxy parses it to identify all <applet> tags on the returning page, and for each <applet> tag so identified, the proxy replaces the named applet with the name of a trusted graphics server applet stored locally to the browser (i.e., stored in a directory named the CLASSPATH environment variable). The proxy then sends this modified page back to the browser ( step 4), which loads the graphics server Play Ground applet upon receiving the page. For each <applet> tag proxy identified, the proxy retrieves the named applet (steps 5-6) and modifies its bytecode to use the graphics server in the requesting browser for all input and output. The proxy forwards the modified applet to the playground (step 7), where it is executed using the graphics server in the browser as an I/O terminal (step 8).
To summarize, there are three important components in the architecture: the graphics server applet that is loaded into the user's browser, the proxy, and the playground. None of these need to be executed on the same machine, and indeed there are benefits to executing them on different machines. In particular, since untrusted code is imported into both the proxy and the playground, they should both be isolated, to the least degree possible, from any sensitive resources in the protected domain (in the limit, they should both be placed outside a firewall). The graphics server and the playground are implemented in Java, and thus can run on any Java compliant environment; the proxy is a Perl script. The same proxy can be used for multiple browsers and multiple playgrounds. In the case of multiple playgrounds, the proxy can distribute load among playgrounds for improved performance.
The trust model is that the small graphics package is easy to analyze and well understood enough to trust while the more dangerous and untrustworthy mobile code has no access to meaningful resources.
This approach cannot be used in conjunction with the usual approach to code signing, as modification of the bytecodes is required.
PROOF-CARRYING CODE
The various aspects of securing mobile code have been dealt with so far. Nevertheless some more issues related to mobile-code are still to be resolved. The critical research issues are:
• Ensuring the host system that the code wouldn't damage it, for example, by corrupting its internal data structures.
• Affirming the host that the un-trusted code does not use too many resources (e.g.: -CPU, Memory) or use them for too long a time period.
• Enabling the host to make such assurances as above without undue effort and deleterious effort on overall system performance.
The "Proof-Carrying Code" approach uses the theory of programming languages including formal semantics, type theory, and applications of logic to solve the un-trusted code security problem. George C. Necula, presently at the University of Berkeley, California, has pioneered this technique.
Proof-Carrying Code is a technique by which the host establishes a set of safety rules that guarantees safe behavior of programs. The code producer creates a formal safety proof that proves the un-trusted code's adherence to safety rules. Then the host uses a simple and fast proof validator to check, with certainty that the proof is valid and the foreign code is safe to execute.
The best way probably to justify the claim of this technique is to know the relative benefits compared to other techniques.
• Almost the entire burden of establishing and formally proving the safety of the un-trusted code is on the code producer. The code consumer, just needs to perform a fast, simple, and easy-to-trust proof-checking process. The reliance of the proof-checker is an important advantage over approaches that involve the use of complex compilers or interpreters in the code consumer.
• The code consumer does not care how the proofs are constructed.
• PCC certified programs are "tamper-proof" in the sense that any modification, will always result in one of the three possible outcomes:
The proof may not be valid any longer and so the mobile-code will be rejected. The proof will still be valid but may not comply with the safety policy of the code-consumer and hence the code will be rejected again. The proof may be valid and still be a safety proof, despite having been tampered. Nevertheless this will not cause any dangerous behavior on the system -so the guarantee of safety still holds.
• PCC system checks the intrinsic properties of the code and not its origin; hence it avoids the intervention of cryptographic approaches and trusted third parties. PCC systems avert execution of dangerous-code through the static verification of the untrusted code.
TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES TO OVERCOME
Though the idea of Proof-carrying code seems to be easy its much more difficult to implement. Some obstacles to overcome are:
• Encoding the formal proof -Trivial encoding of proofs of properties is very large.
• Checking the proof -a typical PCC system requires that the proofs be small, and the Checker to be small, fast and efficient.
• Relating the proof with program: The proof has to convey some information about the program at hand.
NECULA'S PCC SYSTEM
Necula's PCC system comprises of the following components.
1.
A formal specification language, which is used to express the safety policy. Some PCC systems have this component built using first-order predicate logic.
2.
A formal semantics of the language used by the untrusted code. This is in the form of some logic relating programs to specifications. 3. A language used to express the proofs. This component uses one of the several Logical Frameworks (LF) available. For example Edinburg Logical Framework (LF), which is essentially a typed Lambda Calculus to encode and check the proofs. 4. An algorithm for validating the proofs. A simple LF type checker is used to validate the proofs.
5.
A method for generating the safety proofs. Only the code producer uses this component of PCC. Some PCC systems use a theorem prover that emits the required proofs.
This PCC system uses a verification-condition generator (VCgen), for the mobile-code a verification condition, which is a logical formula that guarantees the safety of the mobile-code if true. The code-producer must prove and the code-consumer must check the proof of this verification condition.
STEPS INVOLVED IN A PCC SESSION
The step-by-step description of a typical PCC session, glossing over many implementation details is given below. Figure shows a session based on a canonical PCC implementation where the sequence of steps is determined by the arrows.
Step 1. A PCC Session starts with the code producer preparing the un-trusted code to be sent to the code consumer. As part of this presentation, the producer adds annotations to the code. This can be done manually, or else automatically by a toll such as a certifying compiler. The annotations contain information that helps the code consumer understand the safety-relevant properties of the code. The code producer then sends the annotated code to the code consumer, requesting its execution.
Step 2. Upon receiving the annotated code, the code consumer performs a fast but detailed inspection of the annotated code. This is accomplished using a program called VCGen, which is one component of the consumer-defined safety policy. VCGen performs two tasks. First, it checks simple safety properties of the code. Second, VCGen watches for instructions whose execution might violate the safety policy. When such an instruction is encountered, VCGen emits a predicate that expresses the conditions under which the execution of the instruction is safe. Following the standard terminology from the field of automatic program verification, it is referred as verification conditions. The collection of the verification conditions together with some control flow information, make up the safety predicate, a copy of which is sent to the proof producer.
Step 3. Upon receiving the safety predicate, the proof producer attempts to prove it, and in the event of success it sends an encoding of a formal proof back to the code consumer.
Because the code consumer does not have to trust the proof producer, any system can act as a proof producer. In particular the code producer can also act as the proof producer. Step 4. The next step in a PCC session is the proof validation step performed by the code consumer. This phase is performed using a program which is referred as the proof checker. The proof checker verifies that each inference step in the proof is a valid instance of one of the axioms and inference rules specified as part of the safety policy. In addition, the proof checker verifies that the proof proves the same safety predicate generated in step 2. This prevents an attacker from circumventing the PCC system by submitting, for example, a valid proof of a trivial procedure. 
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Step 5. Finally, after the executable code has passed both the VCGen checks and the proof check, it is trusted not to violate the safety policy. It can thus be safely installed for execution, without any further need for run-time checking.
FOUNDATIONAL PROOF-CARRYING CODE
The choice of the set of axioms necessary to prove or verify is decisive for the speed-efficiency considerations of a typical PCC system. Andrew W. Appel (Princeton University) addressed such a need in his technical paper "Foundational Proof-Carrying Code". A Foundational proof is one that could be constructed from the basics of mathematical logic, without additional axioms and assumptions. The crux of the technique is that a conventional PCC system can guarantee safety if there's no bug in the verification-condition generator or in the logical axioms or in the typing rules or in the proof-checker. If that's the case then the minimum set of axioms and logic are just what could be obtained by using the "Foundational Proof-Carrying Code". This technique also highlights the importance of a PCC system that does not confine to a particular type -system and forbids from using a VC generator as used in Necula's system earlier. As pointed out earlier this technique uses higher-order logic, from which most of the modern mathematics could be built. It has been shown in the paper that both machine-instructions and the safety policies could be easily defined in the higherorder logic.
The advantages of the Foundational PCC over the conventional PCC are:
• Foundational PCC is more flexible because the code producer can "explain" a novel type system or safety argument to the code consumer. i.e., it is independent of the type system. • Foundational PCC is more secure because the trusted base merely consists of the "foundational verification system" together with the machine-instruction semantics and the safety policy.
SEMANTIC MODELS FOR PROOF-CARRYING CODE
The paper "A Semantic Model of Types and Machine Instructions for ProofCarrying Code" suggests a universal type-frame work for proof-carrying code that would allow a code producer to choose a programming language, prove the type rules for that language as lemmas in higher-order logic, then use those lemmas to prove the safety of a particular program. Such a framework has distinct advantages over conventional PCC systems (Necula's PCC system) viz: -
• Programs could be compiled from different source languages and sent to the same code consumer. By using the recommended framework and the safety-policy the code consumer could be made independent of the type system used by the mobilecode.
• Unlike the constraints in the conventional PCC systems it's possible to prove the safety of the allocation and initialization of data structures and not just the traversal of data.
• The recommended approach enables the treatment of wide variety of types, including records, tagged variants, first-class functions first-class labels, existential types, union types, intersection types, and covariant recursive types.
• The most important benefit is that the machine instruction semantics are moved from the verification-condition generator to the safety policy; the dependence on the verification-condition generator (VCgen) was highlighted to be risky, earlier.
The feasibility of using such a framework could be explained using an example, as below. Consider the hypothetical short program (that the code-producer would provide):
"A sequence of integers (1000, 1001) and a proof that if these integers are loaded at address 500 then it can be assumed to be safe to jump there."
The program's pre-condition is that registers 1 point to a record of 2 integers and register 7 points to a return address. The machine instructions of such an imaginary machine could be represented as follows: 100: 1000 r2 m (r1) 101: 1001 jump (r7); r0 pc
The logic framework suggested consists of the set of inference rules and a set of axioms. The inference rules are standard natural-deduction rules of higher-order logic with natural number arithmetic and induction, augmented with just a few predicates and rules concerning the readability, writability, and "jumpability" of machine addresses, and the decoding semantics of machine instructions. The axioms are called as the "safety policy".
The safety policy of the program cited above could be given as the set of axioms as follows: (Read ∀ to mean "For all…") The Axioms 1 and 2 describe what addresses are readable and writable. Axioms 3-7 describe the initial state of the machine, comprising a register-bank r0 and a memory m0, each of which is a function from integers to integers. Axiom 3 conveys that any future state r, m whose program counter r (17) is equal to what's in r 0 (7) is a safe state -more clearly it states that r (7) (the register r 7 ) is a valid return address. Axiom 4 says that r 0 (1) (the register 1 in the register-bank r 0 ) is an address of readable range, and axiom 5 says that the program counter r(17) is initially 100.The remaining axioms 6-7 just convey the un-trusted mobile-code cited above as the hypothetical program.
The code-producer must prove the theorem safe (r 0 , m 0 ) and the code consumer must check the proof before jumping to the address 100.
MODEL-CARRYING CODE (MCC)
A new paradigm for ensuring the security of mobile code is being researched. This approach enables a mobile code consumer to understand and formally reason about what a piece of mobile code can do; and check if the actions of the code are compatible with his/her security policies; if that's the case then execute the code. This compatibilitychecking process is automated but if there are conflicts, code-consumers can refine their policies, taking into account the functionality provided by the mobile code. The approach uses advanced runtime-monitoring techniques to ensure that the code does not violate the consumer's (refined) policies.
The MCC paradigm uses the idea that the mobile-code comes equipped with an expressive yet concise model of code's behavior (security-relevant). Employing such a paradigm greatly automates their generation.
The trust model is that the design and implementation of the verifier are trustworthy but mobile code is universally untrustworthy.
COMPARISION OF THE TECHNIQUES
Which is the best technique for security mobile code is not a fair question. Each of the techniques offers something different, and the best approach is probably a combination of security mechanisms. The sandbox and code signing approaches are already being hybridized. Combining these with firewalling techniques such as the playground gives an extra layer of security. Note that code signing and firewalling can't be in conjunction with each other since, modification of byte code is required.
CONCLUSIONS
The design and implementation of mobile code systems includes all the security issues that arise in traditional stationary-code systems. But Because mobile code systems violate many of the assumptions that underlie traditional security measures, a host new issues arise representing a challenge to the security community. We presented several approaches to protect clients from potentially malicious mobile code. The first technique, called sandboxing, involves utilizing the language type restrictions of Java to limit the access of classes to system resources. The second approach, code signing, involves verifying digital signatures to obtain assurance about the identity of the author of a piece of code.
A third technique, called firewalling, involves intercepting mobile code at the firewall. An alternative and more promising approach is to divert mobile code to a sacrificial machine, with only the user interface code running on the actual client, where valuable resources exist. Finally, proof carrying code represents a new approach to proving safety properties for mobile code, which has important implications for security.
Certainly, the work presented in this paper needs to be incrementally enriched and revised, taking into account experiences, results, and innovations as they emerge from the research activity.
